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superior,'3 and this seems to bring us back to Fisher's definition. In fact, however, close attention to the context of this passage reveals that Aristotle's view of hybris and Fisher's are somewhat different and that Fisher has failed to follow up certain leads which show precisely where hybris fits in Aristotle's ethical theory.
Aristotle's remarks on hybris belong in the context of a discussion of the forensic branch of oratory, which is concerned with acts involving an individual or a community as victim; thus Aristotle discusses the motives, conditions, and circumstances of injustice, and gives a short account of what injustice, the subject-matter of forensic oratory, consists in. Any ascription of injustice to an agent depends on an assessment of his motivation; a bare description of an action, in external terms, is insufficient. Thus some admit that they took but deny that they stole, or admit that they struck but deny that they committed hybris, and so on (1373b38-1374a6). These are disputes about what it is to be unjust or wicked and the opposite, and therefore abouth prohairesis, for wickedness and wrongdoing lie in the prohairesis, and terms such as hybris and klope connote prohairesis (1374a6-13). Fisher translates prohairesis here as 'intention',14 but prohairesis is a technical term in Aristotle's ethical writings which signifies much more than intention.'5 It is important in both ethical treatises (and the Magna Moralia) in the discussion of the various states of character which are classified as excellences or defects, but is discussed in particular detail in EN iii 2-3 (cf. EE ii 10-11, MM 17-19) and vi 2.16 From these and other passages we learn that all actions which result from prohairesis are voluntary, but not all voluntary actions result from prohairesis (thus prohairesis is already distinguished from mere intention),17 and that prohairesis follows deliberation qua deliberative desire to perform actions which contribute to the ends set by one's rational desire for the good. it virtuous or vicious;19 in order, therefore, for a prohairesis to be good, the agent must possess excellence of character,20 and, by the same token, excellence of character requires the exercise of prohairesis (the choice of the specific moral action for its own sake in the light of one's overall conception of the end).21 It is in the prohairesis that we see virtue or vice, and the praise and blame which presence or absence of virtue rightly attracts respond not to the act but to the prohairesis.22
Certain aspects of this picture are particularly relevant to the account of hybris in Rhetoric i 13 and ii 2. First, the Rhetoric agrees with the Ethics that prohairesis is the mark of virtue or vice: 'Wickedness and wrongdoing [gLoX0r ppta Kact tr 6liK?iv] lie in the prohairesis, and such terms (e.g. hybris and theft) connote the prohairesis' (1374all-13). Secondly, hybris was defined as gratuitous insult, motivated by a desire not to achieve any ulterior purpose, but to obtain the intrinsic pleasure of demonstrating one's own superiority through the dishonouring of another (1378b23-8; cf. 1374al3-15). Hybris, then, is explicitly said to be a kind of action performed for its own sake, one which implies a prohairesis, and if the summary indications given in the relevant passages of the Rhetoric presuppose the developed framewor p t d k of the Ethics, then the prohairesis which hybris connotes is much more than an intention. That the reference to prohairesis at Rhetoric 1374a 1-13 does presuppose the technical sense of that term is apparent from the context in which it occurs, for the entire discussion of adikia in i 10-13 is clearly related to that of justice and injustice in EN v.23 Thus r6 6lwK?iv is defined as voluntary injury in contravention of the law (1368b6-7), the criteria of the voluntary are summarily rehearsed (b9-10; cf. EN 1135al5-b8), and voluntary action is distinguished from action on prohairesis (blO-12; cf. EN 1135b8-11), which is a sign of vice. Injustice in the fullest sense exists when the agent acts on prohairesis, and this is a sign of the possession of a vicious hexis (1374a9-13; cf. 1374bl3-16); but acts of injustice may also be committed by those who do not possess this hexis, for example by those who act in anger (1373b33-8); and acts which harm others may be committed unintentionally, though ignorance of some relevant particular, or by pure accident (1374b4-10).24 This is clearly a simplified version of EN v's distinction between atychemata, hamartemata, adimat, adikemata, and 'being an unjust person' (1135a5-1136a5). The important point for our purposes is that it is only in the last case that the 19 24 That the treatment of justice and injustice is concluded by a discussion of epieikeia (1374a26-b23; cf. EN 1137a31-1138a3) is another sign that the framework of the EN is being applied. agent acts with prohairesis; this has the consequence that one can actually commit an unjust act, and commit it intentionally, and yet still not be an unjust person-one can steal and yet not be a thief, commit adultery and yet not be an adulterer (1134al7-23);25 in order to be a thief or an adulterer (etc.) one must possess a settled disposition to choose such vicious acts for their own sake, qua acts of injustice.26 Thus if the act of hybris is to connote prohairesis it will demand more than an intention to dishonour another, for such an intention is possible even in cases where no prohairesis is present. That Aristotle's first expression of his view of hybris occurs in the context of a discussion of justice and injustice already suggests that he sees hybris as a form of injustice,27 and that the hexis from which hybris springs is that which is identified in EN v (1129a31-bl0, 1130a14-b18, b30-1132b20, and passim) as 'particular injustice' (1 tv 9kipel/KIXa L gpoS &dlKCa). This is confirmed when we see that the characteristics of particular injustice match those of hybris very closely. First, particular injustice is concerned with pleonexia, with wanting more of some external good (1129a32-bll); this greed, however, is not purely material, as it covers desire not just for money, but also for time, safety, and other things of that type (1130b2-4).28 This kind of injustice can be manifested in the distribution of goods, but also in the context of 'involuntary transactions' in which an agent creates an unfair inequality between himself and a patient in respect of some good, whether by stealth or by force (EN 1131al-9). Thus particular injustice can be concerned with honour, requires a specific victim, and can be manifested in words or in deeds, by physical assault (aikeia, 1131a8) or by verbal insult (propelakismos, 1131a9;29 with all this, cf. Rhet. 1374al3-15, 1378b23-8). Just as the hybristes is motivated by desire for a particular kind of pleasure (Rhet., ibid., cf 1380b4-5, also EN 1149b21), so particular injustice seeksular isthe pleasurtice thatseeks the comespleasure that cfromes from the kerdos (EN 1130b4);30 particular injustice also requires the initiation of wrongdoing, and is not found in 25 As in Rhet. 1373b33-8, the sign of 'doing injustice' as opposed to 'being unjust' is action in the grip of a pathos, typically anger; cf. For the distinction between 'doing injustice' and 'being unjust', cf. 1134a32-3, 1137a4-9, 17-26. It may seem that this is ignored isn the passage of the Rhet. under discussion; the point of 1373b38-1374al8, after all, is not that of EN 1134al7-23 (the former distinguishes between [e.g.] theft and justifiable removal, the latter between [e.g.] being a thief and committing a theft), and at 1374al 1-12 r6 dcI&Eiv, in apparent contradiction of the EN, is said to lie in prohairesis; similarly, 1374b4-10 fails to distinguish between adikemata and 'being unjust', attributing adike^mata to pone^ria. Thus Cope (n. 11) i 257-8 argues that the EN's distinction between 'doing injustice' and 'being unjust' is not operative in the Rhet.; but, as Grimaldi observes (Aristotle: Rhetoric i [New York 1980] 293-4, 304), precisely that distinction is made at 1373b35-6. There may be no real problem here: perhaps t6 6iteiv at 1374al2 and 30c xcaxa at 1374b8-9 are used in a non-technical sense, of the unjust actions of an unjust character, and we might say that the refinement of the schema, introducing non-prohaeretic adikemata as a category distinct from possession of a vicious character, though presupposed, is not explicitly activated; but if instead we prefer to see inconsistency, it will be an inconsistency within the Rhet. passage itself, not between Rhet. and EN.
27Cf. the explicit references to hybris as a type of unjust act at Rhet. 1373a34-5, 1374all-12, 1389b7-8, 1391al8-19; cf. also [Arist.] De Virt. 1251a30-6) and [PI.] Def. 415el2 (Fisher 11).
28 Aristotle is aware that he is using pleonexia in an extended sense (cf. 1132a7-14, b ll-18), and so it is no objection to the interpretation of hybris as a kind of particular injustice/pleonexia that elsewhere hybris and pleonexia are distinguished (e.g. Pol. 1302b5-9; Fisher 22-4). 29 According to Ammonius (De Adfin. Vocab. Diff. 20; cf. Fisher 53 n. 52) hybreis are distinguished from aikeiai by the fact that propelakismos is necessary for the former; on propelakismos and hybris, cf. Fisher 44 n. 31, 48, 93, 107.
30 Kerdos is to be understood here not as gain per se, but as that gain at another's expense which is characteristic of particular injustice; the pleonexia in which particular injustice consists is essentially comparative; cf. Irwin, Principles (n. 17) 426, 429 and 624 nn. 4-6. This notion of comparison is, as we shall see, also fundamental to hybris. retaliation (1138a20-2; cf. on hybris, Rhet. 1378b23-8 once more, also 1379a30-5, 1402al-5). Both hybris and particular injustice, then, involve taking the initiative in exalting oneself at the expense of others, for no other motive than the pleasure of the offence itself.3' That the characteristics of hybris are those of a form of particular injustice seems to me indisputable.32
If hybris is a type of conduct which results from the vicious hexis of particular injustice, then Fisher has not only failed to identify the place of hybris in Aristotle's scheme, he has also underestimated the extent to which Aristotle's remarks on hybris form part of a systematic ethical theory, which, while it starts from the opinions of the many (and the wise), not infrequently has to revise the significance of popular terms in order to accommodate them.33 The main upshot of this is that Fisher places too little emphasis on the dispositional aspect of the concept. Aristotle would probably have allowed that, just as one can commit an unjust act without being an unjust person, so one can commit an act of hybris without possessing the hexis necessary for action with prohairesis; and he is as capable as paother authors of using hybris-words in 'behaviourist' senses (less with reference to the motivation of the agent than to the objective infliction of dishonour on a patient);34 but in the paradigm case, in which hybris connotes vice and requires prohairesis, it requires a specific sort of motivation rooted deeply in a developed and settled state of character, a state of character which, in the sphere of honour, leads one to enjoy unfairly pressing one's own claims in the face of the legitimate claims of others. This, the disposition which is necessary for hybris, is something rather more than a simple intention or tendency to act, and thus Aristotle's definition in terms of prohairesis differs markedly from Fisher's in terms of intention; at the same time, Fisher's stress on the actual infliction of dishonour and its effects on the patient underestimates Aristotle's emphasis on the agent's attitude to his own honour, which is both apparent in the definition at Rhet. 1378b23-8, and necessary if hybris is to be a form of injustice, of the pleonexia which seeks more for oneself at the expense of others. The comparative nature of the concept of pleonexiaparticular injustice in EN v isolates what I shall argue to be a fundamental feature of hybris-that as a way of going wrong about one's own claim to honour it inevitably involves going wrong about the claims to honour of others (and vice versa). True, Aristotle does define hybris in terms of acts, but even though hybris is, for him, always a particular way of treating another person, it is not the nature of the act or the effect on the 31 Hybris thus meets the criteria for vicious action in the fullest sense-it springs from a settled disposition to choose the vicious course for its own sake, in so far as it is pleasant. This also answers to a typical feature of hybris in ordinary usage, in which to say that someone acted 'not out of hybris, but ... [for some further motive]' is to deny acting 'just for badness', as a demonstration of one's insolent disregard for law or convention; see (e.g.) Lys. vii 13; cf. Thuc. iv 95.8, Xen. Anab. v 5.16, Dem. xxi 181-2; Fisher 49, 98, 103.
32 This helps explain why Aristotle imagines that hybris must always have a victim-all forms of injustice are necessarily iCp6; ftcpov (EN 1129b25-1130a1 3; cf. 1130b20; 1 130b1 -5), and, as a form of particular injustice, hybris must occur in 'involuntary transactions' involving two parties. Aristotle's discussion of 'involuntary transactions', moreover, focuses on cases where correction will be forthcoming from a judicial source (1130b33-1131a9, 1131b25-1132b20); likewise in the Rhet. the reference to hybris in i 13 (1373b38-1374al8) is specifically related to the needs of the forensic orator (esp. 1374a7-9). The account of hybris in ii 2 (1378bl3-34) forms part of a discussion of the pathe which frequently goes far beyond these needs, but even there hybris is discussed qua form of oligoria and cause of anger, and so the context demands concentration on affronts involving an agent and a patient; it should thus be no surprise that forms of hybris which would be unlikely to form the basis of a court action or at least of a dispute between two parties are not considered in Aristotle's definition. Cf. MacDowell (n. 2) G&R 28, Meidias 20, against Fisher 9. This is not to say that Aristotle is defining a distinct 'legal' sense of hybris, merely that apparently victimless cases do not occur to him, given the contexts in which he expresses his views on hybris. honour of the patient which makes an act hybristic, but the motive; and that motive is a prohairesis, a particular choice of a developed character. Aristotle does not explicitly (unlike other authors)35 refer to this state of character as hybris,36 but be does have a name for it, since by virtue of the possession of such a state one is called a hybristes. Now, the term hybristes is derived from hybris, and thus the latter is prior in definition to the former; but we can be sure that to be a hybristes for Aristotle is not just to be liable to commit hybristic acts; qua unjust acts manifesting prohairesis, hybristic acts must be defined as those which the possessor of a particular hexis would perform. The hexis from which hybris springs is that of injustice in its narrower sense. That in seitself allows us to adumbrate the typical characteristics of the hybristic agent to a certain extent. But other contexts provide further help in narrowing down the precise nature of the disposition to choose from which hybris results.
Our best evidence comes in a handful of passages in which Aristotle discusses hybris as typical of particular character types. The Rhetoric's discussion of characterpity and fear, for example, consider not only the dispositions which give rise to these emotions (O; &xaf 1CtuEVOt a)tot oopofdfvai , 1382b29), but also those which do not. Both pity and fear require the notion of one's own vulnerability to misfortune; by contrast, those who believe that their current good fortune renders them invulnerable to reversal are disposed not to pity or to fear, but, being hybristai (1383a2), and 'in a hybristic condition (diathesis)' (1385b30-), to hybrizein (1385b21). Even if hybrizein here does imply the expression of contempt for the unfortunate in word or deed,37 Aristotle can refer to a hybristic disposition from which such concrete expressions spring, a disposition which entails a blind over-valuation of oneself caused by the experience or the illusion of excessive prosperity. All the stress in these passages is on the subjective attitude of the hybristes;38 in these accounts of people who are disposed to manifest hybris it is the agent's sense of his own superiority that is emphasized, rather than its expression in acts which affect others. Clearly, dishonouring others is the obverse of over-valuing oneself, but these passages provide further evidence that the latter side of the coin figures more prominently in Aristotle's concept of hybris than the former, and they should be used to emphasize the element of the sense of one's own superiority in the definitions of hybris at the expense of the mere intention to cause a diminution of honour in others.
The sketches of the characteristics of the young, the rich, and the powerful in the Rhetoric and Politics also consistently attribute the hybris of those groups to their failure to form an appropriate conception of their own worth vis-a'-vis that of others. The characterization of the young at Rhet. 1389a2-bl2, for example, stresses their naivete, their inexperience of misfortune, and their acute attachment to time.39 When hybris enters this picture, it is with specific reference to acts of insult or mockery (their acts of injustice tend more towards hybris than to petty wrongdoing, and they are witty, since wit is educated hybris, b7-12), but these acts spring from a particular type of character, one which lacks the experience which should set limits to one's self-confidence and self-assertion.
Being hybristic and arrogant is likewise one of the 'characters' (ethe, 1390b32) which attend wealth, and the acquisition of wealth creates the illusion that one possesses all good things, 35 As Fisher (493) admits. Cf. above, n. 6. Aristotle's account of hybris thus resembles his discussions of aidos in failing to recognize that hybris, like aidos, can be the name of a disposition; see my Aidos (Oxford 1993) which is the basis of the disposition of being hybristai and hyperephanoi (1390b34-1391al). As a result of this error, the rich have a false idea of their own worth and a misplaced confidence in their own good fortune (1391al-14).40 The Politics also recognizes the tendency of the excessively fortunate to become hybristai and commit hybris (1295b6-11); again, the specific reference of the noun, hybris, is to a type of unjust act (bl0-11), but one which springs from a mistaken belief that one's particular good fortune entitles one to a greater share of honour than it should. Similarly, at 1334a25-8 we read that war compels men to be just and to sophronein, whereas enjoyment of good fortune and leisure in time of peace makes them hybristai. All the terms here are dispositional; war fosters a disposition of modesty and self-restraint, prosperity and peace one of over-confidence and self-assertion;41 to be sure, these are dispositions to act, but still this passage resembles the others cited in making it clear that to possess the disposition which is necessary for hybris is to have a particular mistaken view of oneself and one's lot in life. In Pol. 1295b8-9 it is the absence of reason which explains the mistaken attitude to good or bad fortune. The same point is made at EN 1124a26-b6; the megalopsychos has the right attitude to time and the goods for which one receives time; others who enjoy the same external advantages, but lack virtue, are wrong in thinking themselves worthy of great things and should not be called megalopsychoi. These people instead become supercilious (hyperoptai) and hybristai, because without arete it is hard to deal appropriately with good fortune; unable to bear their good fortune and thinking themselves superior they despise others and do whatever they please. In this they resemble the megalopsychos, but his contempt for others is rational where theirs is not. It could not be made clearer that one's attitude to oneself and one's own worth is for Aristotle a more important constituent of hybris than one's attitude to others; to be a hybristes one's contempt for others must be based on a mistaken conception of one's own worth.
It cannot be said that Fisher ignores such passages;42 but he uses them simply to establish what he sees as the conditions or causes of hybris, which properly consists in intentional acts of affront. But Aristotle's definitions of hybris presuppose a reference to a source of motivation which provides the crucial criterion for differentiating a hybristic act from an apparently similar non-hybristic act; hence these dispositional factors are not mere concomitants or causes, but characteristics of the hexis which is necessary for hybris. To be a hybristes is not just to possess a drive, tendency, or intention to commit hybristic acts, but to entertain a misguided and inflated conception of oneself and one's place in the world. Aristotle's sketches of hybristic character-types concentrate much more on the subject's excessive concern for his own honour than on his assaults on the honour of others.
III
Aristotle's view of hybris thus diverges from Fisher's at precisely the point where Fisher and his modern critics also differ, on the importance of the disposition of the hybristic agent. Yet Aristotle and Fisher remain close in that they both believe that hybris is essentially a way of behaving towards other people. Aristotle may place more emphasis on the dispositional aspect, 40 The same misapprehension which makes the rich hybristai and hyperephanoi makes the powerful hyperephanoteroi at 1391a33-bl; it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the adj. hyperephanos reinforces the connotation of hybristes at 1390b33. Cf. Armstrong and Peterson (n. 38) 69. 41 The frequent opposition between hybris and sophrosyne (see Fisher, Index, s.v.) contrasts two ways of coping with one's self-assertive urges, and reinforces my contention that the element of over-valuation of one's own honour in hybris is more important than Fisher allows. Fisher (111) argues that sophrosyne is an antonym of hybris only in so far as it restrains that desire to wrong others which hybris primarily denotes, but the falsity of this follows from that of the view of hybris it employs. 42 See Fisher 12, 19-25. but he agrees with Fisher in so far as he gives no explicit indication of believing that the word hybris may be used as the name of a disposition which need not issue in acts infringing the timeA of a particular victim. Our task now is to decide whether this restriction of the reference of hybris applies across the board. First we shall look at some passages in which it seems to me that the dispositional aspect is decisive for the application of the hybris-term; these are passages in which either specific acts or victims are not mentioned or else the effects of acts on victims are not constitutive of the hybris described. My focus here is partly on the requirement that hybris entails a conscious intention to dishonour, partly on Fisher's dictum that 'in almost all cases the victim of hybris is patently present in the context; where it can or has been doubted [sic] that there is a victim, in all cases it can be plausibly argued that one is supposed by the argument' (148). Both these requirements, it seems to me, need to be relaxed.
Several of the relevant passages come from Fisher's general discussion of the links between luxury (tryphe^) and hybris (113-17). At Demosthenes xxxvi 42 the hybris envisaged is that of
Apollodorus: if the Athenians turn the disputed sums over to him they will see his opponent, Phormio, in extreme need, while Apollodorus behaves with hybris and spends money on the things he usually spends it on. For Fisher (113), the verb hybrizein here is not merely a condemnation of Apollodorus' 'extravagant and dissolute behaviour', but signals that such behaviour would constitute an affront against the unjustly defeated Phormio. I agree that the contrast between Apollodorus and Phormio is emphasized in the text, and thus ths at Apollodorus' reaction to his success at Phormio's expense is an important part of the meaning of hybrizein in the passage, but there is little warrant for believin that Apollodorus is an elt to be imagined as deliberately spending his ill-gotten gains on luxuries and depravities with the specific intention of further dishonouring his defeated opponent; rather, those who witness his extravagant behaviour are invited to construe it as hybris on the grounds that it manifests a shameless self-absorption which others, especially those who have suffered at Apollodorus' hands, will find offensive. The affront to Phormio and others is not Apollodorus' intention in enjoying his luxurious lifestyle in his usual way; rather, his behaviour constitutes an implicit affront to those at whose expense he carouses and those whose claim to honour he ignores. If hybrizein may refer to excessive self-assertion which dishonours others simply by failing to take their claims into account, then there is no specific intention to commit a particular act of dishonour, and this case does not fit Fisher's definition of hybris.43 Two passages in Euripides' Troades demonstrate that, while hybris (qua luxuriating in a misplaced sense of one's own superiority) can be construed as an affront to a particular group of other people (because they have more reason than others to resent the agent's self-assertion), it can also be seen as an attitude which affronts other people in general. At 993-7 there is no hint that the hybris of which Hecuba accuses Helen was intended by the latter to dishonour anyone in particular; Fisher's suggestion, that in ob' fAv tKavdc aot Td MevfX?) / gfkaOpa xoci; <axt; tya943ppfetv Tp0xxai; (996-7) Hecuba refers to a kind of 'extravagance and dominant "queening it" [which] would be felt to involve an assertiveness against a husband, characteristic of foreign queens',44 is a rather desperate attempt to maintain his schema-Helen's 43 [D.] xlviii 55 (Fisher 114; cf. 440-1) is an even clearer example of the same thing. Here again hybrizein is a matter of excessive enjoyment of (illegitimately acquired) prosperity and again there is an element of comparison, between Olympiodorus' hetaira and the women of the speaker's own household; there is no implication that the former does or says anything which is specifically designed to bring disgrace on the latter. Rather, they are imagined as 'taking it personally' that she should lay claim to a greater degree of honour than is felt appropriate for a person in her position. hybris does consist in extravagant 'queening it', but there is no reference to a specific victim.
Instead, Hecuba represents Helen's behaviour as signifying an excessive claim to honour which entails an implicit lack of regard for the honour of anyone in Helen's group or vicinity.45
The occurrence of hybrizein in Eumaeus' denunciation of Melanthius at Od. xvii 244-6 is comparable:46 Eumaeus prays that Odysseus will return and put an end to the aglaiai, the 'splendour' or 'ostentation', with which the goatherd, behaving with hybris (Oppftcov), now conducts himself. Fisher sees Melanthius' deliberate insult in his disobedience towards his masters, and possibly also his specific acts of violence and abuse towards his fellow servants and their guests, but the reference of the participle is clearly to the goatherd's ostentatious behaviour and demeanour;47 this is an insult to anyone who has reason to resent such presumption, but the reference of the hybris-word is once again to a misplaced exaltation of the agent's own honour which only implicitly constitutes an attack on the honour of others. Those who may feel themselves dishonoured by the goatherd's conduct do not figure in the thoughts of the agent at all; the dishonour to them consists precisely in his focusing on his own honour to the exclusion of theirs.48
In all these passages49 the relevant hybris-word refers to a particular attitude to one's own prosperity or good fortune. The emphasis is on the disposition of the agent, but this is a disposition which inevitably has implications for the relationship between the agent and other people; this seems to me to answer very well to the emphases of the Aristotelian passages considered above, where it was clear that both the disposition of the agent (involving a feeling of superiority and a confidence that one is invulnerable to the misfortunes which plague others) hybris. Hybris is a concept to which both ones is a concept to which both one's own and others' honour are relevant, are relevantnd this not merely in the sense that specific acts of insult are typically intended to increase one's own prestige at others' expense.
IV
At this point it may seem that Fisher and I are not terribly far apart; with regard to the passages just discussed, we agree that the behaviour described as hybris can be construed as an insult against someone. But whereas Fisher demands a conscious intention deliberately to insult a particular victim, I argue that hybris may be a subjective attitude or disposition which can be construed as an implicit affront. My emphasis is on that element of hybris which relates to one's 45 Equally, at 1019-22 the hybris manifested in Helen's enjoyment of barbarian proskynesis involves no intention to insult anyone in particular, but an excessive conceit of her own worth, implicitly insulting to all those who do not accept that Helen's honour is superior to their own. It is this lack of a proper appreciation of the interplay between her own and others' honour that Hecuba misses in Helen at 1025-8 (Cairns [n. 35] 298). 46 Fisher 171. 47 Pompous ostentation (rather than deliberate insult) is the sense of hybris at Athen. 522c (a rejected motive for the wearing of Persian dress); cf. hybrismenos of clothing at Xen. Cyr. ii 4.5 and (negatively) of a shield-device at E. Pho. 1111-12; also of excessively expensive and ostentatious hospitality at Ael. VH i 31 (on all these, see Fisher 116-17). In the passages which Fisher (ibid.) cites from Clearchus (frr. 43a, 46, 47, 48 Wehrli), hybris is a consequence of luxury, and most of the applications of hybris-words refer to concrete acts of dishonour; but in 43a the phrase, KaCi 7n6ppco tpo6yovt?c; 3p?co;, which links the tryphe of the Lydians' gardens and their gross acts of hybris against others' womenfolk, must indicate that the former as well as the latter involve hybris. 48 In this passage, as in the others quoted above (this section), Fisher takes an absolute use of the verb hybrizein as equivalent to a transitive. But my interpretation suggests that the distinction made by LSJ s.v. between transitive and absolute uses is wholly warranted, even if in some instances it is impossible to be sure whether an unstated object is to be assumed. 49 Cf. Theopompus, FGrH 115 F 213 (Fisher 115). own honour, and I argue that the state of mind which over-values one's own honour is decisive for hybris, even though hybris regularly involves an assault on the honour of others, and even though over-valuation of one's own honour virtually always constitutes at least a potential affront. This may still not seem like much of a difference, and it may look as though Fisher could accommodate my criticisms without drastically altering his overall thesis; but the real distance between our positions will emerge in this section, when we look at Fisher's arguments for excluding the disposition of 'thinking big', pride, or presumption from his definition. Terms such as mega phronein are, I shall argue, ways of referring to the subjective, dispositional aspect of hybris, and thus, since hybris-words can be used in purely dispositional senses, hybris and 'thinking big' can amount to the same thing. Fisher repeatedly denies this;50 even when the two ideas occur in close proximity wity h reference to the behaviour of the same agent, they remain (he maintains) conceptually distinct.
Many passages in which the relevant locutions occur are too general to provide much help in settling the matter; whether we distinguish or associate 'thinking big' and hybris in these cases will depend on our interpretation of passages which offer more hope of establishing the relationship between the two sets of terms. The most obvious of these is to be found in Sophocles' Ajax,5' at the end of the speech in which Menelaus, justifying his prohibition of burial, attempts to set Ajax's behaviour in the context of the norms of military and civic discipline. He concludes: 'These things go by turns. Previously he was a flagrant hybristes, now it is my turn to think big. And I forbid you to bury this corpse, or else you yourself will meet an early grave if you bury him' (1087-90).
According to Fisher, Menelaus' 'assertion that Ajax was a "blazing hybristes", but that he now "thinks big" proclaims that committing hybris is the arrogant, violent crime of those who possess, or seek, power, and merely "thinking big" is acceptable and justified self-confidence in one's capacity to exercise power and achieve a satisfactory revenge over one's defeated enemies'. But this falsifies the relationship between the terms; Menelaus' language has become precisely antithetical,52 and he says explicitly that tptct oapxockki` trac oc (1087); the things which alternate should be parallel, and that Ajax's hybris and Menelaus' 'thinking big' are parallel is indicated by the use of the adverb, orb (1088)-it is now Menelaus' turn to play a role similar to that played by Ajax before, when he was a hybristes. This must mean that hybristes, applied to Ajax, refers not to his commission of specific acts, but to his general demeanour as one who, as Menelaus represents it, found military discipline impossible to bear. It is to this attitude of self-assertion that Menelaus' 'thinking big' now responds, and so 'being a hybristes' and 'thinking big' must, at the least, be two ways of describing a disposition of confidence in one's own power.
One must concede, however, that Menelaus is unlikely to be describing his own attitude explicitly as hybristic; thus, while the logic of his remarks demands that 'being a hybristes' must involve 'thinking big', it is likely that by terming his own attitude 'thinking big' he means to differentiate it from hybris. And Fisher repeatedly points out that the expression 'thinking big' differs from hybris in that it may be used of justifiable self-assertion, where hybris is generally pejorative.54 But the very wording of Menelaus' observation suggests that there is a far closer parallel between himself and Ajax than he means to draw, and it is virtually certain that his description of himself as 'thinking big' alerts the audience to the possibility of hybris on his own part. Menelaus intends a parallel between unjustified and justified 'thinking big'; but the logic of pn7?t napaXVX4 T vaDfT is best preserved if the audience take him at his word, and see both forms of 'thinking big' as illegitimate.
This interpretation is confirmed by the chorus-leader (1091-2): 'Menelaus, do not lay down wise maxims and then yourself become a hybristes on the dead.' Fisher maintains that the hybris against which Menelaus is now warned is the prohibition of burial and nothing else, and thus (as usual) an action bringing dishonour on a specific victim. There is little warrant for this in the text; but even if the primary reference of the chorus-leader's words is to non-burial, it remains significant that he uses the same word as Menelaus had used of Ajax at 1088, and that he uses the dispositional term, hybristes, rather than the verb, hybrizein. There is a clear sequence of thought running from the description of Ajax as a hybristes at 1088, through Menelaus' avowal of his own megalophrosyne' in the same line, to the chorus-leader's warning that Menelaus is becoming hybristic at 1092; 'thinking big' is the feature common to both the hybris of Ajax, as identified by Menelaus, and the hybris of Menelaus, as identified by the chorus-leader. The sequence of thought in this passage is just too neat and precise to admit the a priori distinctions that Fisher maintains.
This interpretation of Menelaus' remarks and the Coryphaeus' response to them also sits
better with the dialectic of hybris in the play as a whole, where hybris has been applied to what 'they' do to 'us', rather than to what 'we' do to 'them'.55 Even if Menelaus does not go so far as sanguinely to proclaim himself a hybristes, his remarks none the less encapsulate this process of retaliatory hybris.56 The same pattern is exemplified in the ensuing confrontation between Teucer and Menelaus, in another passage which reveals the connexion between 'thinking big' and hybris (1120-5): commenting on a disposition currently being manifested in speech. The same is true of Teucer's defence of his own 'big thoughts' at 1125; Menelaus has identified a formidable spirit of self-confidence behind Teucer's language; Teucer then justifies the spirit and the insulting language/behaviour with the claim that such are permissible when right is on one's side. 'Thinking big' in 1125, like thymos in 1124 and 'thinking no small thought' at 1120, refers to a demeanour manifested in behaviour, and there is no great difference between saying 'This fellow thinks big' and 'This fellow is insulting me': the reference to the disposition is a comment on the behaviour. This being so, we can understand the logic of Teucer's defence of his own 'thinking big'; Menelaus' references to Teucer's spirit and to his 'thoughts' accuse him of insolence; Teucer realizes that, in effect, he is being accused of hybris, and so defends himself. As all the dispositional terms in this short passage are used to refer to actual behaviour, there cannot be as sharp a distinction as Fisher maintains between hybris, the act, and 'thinking big', the state of mind. We have seen that a disposition of excessive self-assertion can be construed as an effective insult; now it appears that an actual insult can be described in terms of a disposition of excessive self-assertion. As hybris can refer to a disposition which can be described as 'thinking big', so 'thinking big' can refer to behaviour which might otherwise be called hybris.
That 'thinking big' and hybris can be identical in reference is also demonstrated by three passages of Herodotus vii involving the response of Artabanus to Xerxes' proposed invasion of Greece. Xerxes outlines his intentions hiand his motives in vii 8, and it is clear that the pursuit of honour is high among his priorities-he does not wish to be left behind in honour vis-a-vis his ancestors, and sees the expedition a s a means of obtaining kudos and winnig back time lost
as a result of the burning of Sardis and the failure of the previous expedition (vii 8ac.2-y.l); this concern for honour, too, is presented in extravagant terms-Xerxes intends to yoke the Hellespont (P. 1), and cherishes an image of the Persian empire, after the conquest of Greece, encompassing all the ands on the sun shines, equalling 'Zeus' heaven' in extent (Y.1-2). So Xerxes is motivated by honour, believes that he possesses a status sufficient to consider subduing the elements, and dreams of making his dominion co-extensive with the sovereignty of Zeus. Xerxes is also a typical hybristes in believing that his good fortune and that of his nation can only continue-god is guiding Persian destiny for the best, and the Persians themselves have merely to follow (ac. 1).
Artabanus sees the dangers in his nephew's plan; he points out that confidence does not always precede success, as in the case of Darius' expedition against the Scythians (vii 10oc), and gives good grounds for caution in undertaking any enterprise against the Greeks, making particular reference to the (apparently pragmatic) dangers of bridging great waterways (cc-6). Having stressed the importance of euboulia (106), he offers a general, theological warning against over-confidence: 'the god' blasts those creatures which stand out, and does not allow them to 'show off' (phantazesthai), but is not irritated by the insignificant; the same applies to houses and trees, for the god is wont to cut back all things that stand out. Thus a great army can be destroyed by a small, because the god allows no one but himself to think big (10e).58 This last argument clearly constitutes a response which is very closely focused on Xerxes' proposals, on their dangerous over-confidence which threatens to encroach even upon the time of the gods.
Artabanus' second evaluation of Xerxes' plan comes at vii 16a, after Xerxes has relented from his previous fury at his uncle's opposition, but has been warned by a dream-figure against calling off the expedition. Xerxes now wishes Artabanus to sit on his throne and sleep in his
Artabanus' argument shifts from the notion of divine resentment of all forms of prominence to particular resentment of human presumption; the latter is his main point, the former merely an illustration, and the function of the warning as a whole is to provide another perspective on the unexpected failure of great armies when they cross significant natural frontiers to take on apparently inferior opponents. bed, in order that the same dream may appear to him and he may judge that it is sent by the gods, and although Artabanus is reluctant to accept this invitation, he feels himself under compulsion. He prefaces his acceptance, however, with a rehearsal of his previous opposition to a proposal which 'increased hybris' and involved 'always seeking to have something more than what is present'. Even when convinced by the dream-figure that the expedition must go ahead, Artabanus reiterates his earlier position, referring (with examples) to the failure of the strong to overcome the weak, stressing Xerxes' youth, and contrasting the dangers of 'desiring many things' with the virtues of 'keeping quiet' (vii 18.2-3).
This third comment on the merits of the expedition has elements in common with each of the previous; it returns to the central point of the first, that great forces have often been overcome by weaker, and with the second it shares an awareness of the dangers of seeking more. Hybris is associated with 'desiring many things' in the second passage, while in the third 'desiring many things' is associated with disastrous attempts by greater forces to subdue weaker; this brings b s us full circle back to the first passage, where one reason for the failure of such attempts is 'thinking big'. All three passages concern attempts to increase power and prestige beyond a vague limit of what is 'enough'; hybris is one way of describing the drive to do this, 'thinking big' is another, and the connexions between the three passages suggest that there is not much to choose between them.59
Another reason for assuming that hybris and 'thinking big' are virtually interchangeable here is the presumption that Artabanus' characterization of the proposal to invade Greece should refer to identifiable characteristics of Xerxes' original speech. We saw that that speech was strong on self-assertion, manifesting a desire to restore and enhance the monarch's prestige; there were also hints that this concern for individual royal time was somewhat in excess of the norm, envisaging a degree of success which no mortal had hitherto attained. This is readily construed as 'thinking big'; but qua extravagant exaltation of one's own claim to honour, stemming from youth, existing good fortune, inexperience of failure, inexperienceand blind faith in continued successfailure, and blind faith in continued success, it also patently deserves the title of hybris. In this case it is not merely other mortals who are imagined as affronted, but the gods themselves; Artabanus' statement that 'the god does not allow anyone other than himself to think big' is a recognition that Xerxes' excessive pursuit of honour constitutes an implicit assault on those who possess the most time of all; that the god is the party affected in this case does not alter the fact that we have here what is, on my account, a perfectly standard case of hybris involving the pursuit of greater honour for oneself in a way that threatens the honour of others.
Fisher's interpretation,60 on the other hand, demands that we dissociate Artabanus' first and second evaluations from what Xerxes actually said; on his account, the 'thinking big' of the first speech does not refer to a specific offence on Xerxes' part, but is rather an aspect of Persian 59 See Dickie (n. 2) 104-6. Of particular importance are Artabanus' references to the expeditions against the Massagetae, the Ethiopians, and the Scythians; all three, qua attempts to extend power beyond natural limits, have a symbolic function both in themselves and in the presentation of Xerxes' expedition; thus, although Artabanus advances sound pragmatic reasons against the crossing of important natural frontiers and the attempt by greater powers to subdue smaller, his reference to these campaigns is not simply intended to stress the material dangers of expansionism (pace Fisher 372), and this constitutes another link between the three passages, esp. between the warning against 'thinking big' and divine phthonos in the first and the reference to the three previous campaigns in the third. Cleveland 1966) 75, 84, 91-2, 130, 132, 166, 183 n. 103, 293, 316 power which attracts (non-moral) divine jealousy;61 whereas the hybris which Artabanus identifies in his second speech is not Xerxes' own, and has little to do with his acute concern for his own honour, but rather refers to a political characteristic of the Persian nation, its tendency towards imperialist expansionism, bringing 'dishonour' on the autonomous peoples who are its victims. This explanation fails, first because there is no warrant for distinguishing Persian hybris as an abstract national characteristic from the hybris of those who formulate and the Nurse argues that 'The Cyprian is not a thing to be borne if she flows in full spate; the one who yields she attends with gentleness, but whomever she finds excessive and thinking big, she takes and treats with incredible hybris'. 'Thinking big', then, is resisting the power of the goddess, the sort of t t hat provokes her to anger to such a degree that she retaliates by subjecting her victim to degrading and dishonouring treatment. Compare 473-6: 'Please, my dear child, give up your perverse thoughts, stop behaving with hybris-for this is nothing but hybris, wishing to be superior to the gods-and endure in your passion.' Both passages comment on the same sort of conduct; the one sees resistance to the goddess as 'thinking big', the other as hybris, and both designations identify that attitude which magnifies the honour of oneself and diminishes that of others. Fisher, however, sees the matter entirely differently; mega phronein is a mere condition or concomitant of hybris,65 while the hybris which is actually identified 61 The interplay between hybris. 'thinking big', and phthonos is discussed below. In the present context Fisher (374) may be right to say that the description of the divine reaction as phthonos soft-pedals the offensiveness of Xerxes' or the Persians' 'big thoughts' (whereas the description hybris calls attention to a moral offence), but it remains clear that 'the god' regards such presumption as an affront. Fisher (ibid.) states that the suffering of great armies, which, through divine phthonos, fall victim to small, is 'undeserved'; but this is not the implication of ftvaftco; Cowtrv, which contrasts the potential of the greater force for victory with the actual outcome of defeat; defeat was unworthy of them because it was incommensurate with their strength in numbers, abilities (etc.). is explained away as 'a cunning sophistry', a 'persuasive definition'. There is no persuasive definition; the gods participate in a hierarchy of honour in which the time they possess is quantitatively but not qualitatively different from that of mortals; to think big to the extent of considering oneself equal or superior to a god is hopelessly to inflate one's own time' and provocatively to ignore the time^ of the god; thus the conditions of hybris are satisfied. The sophistry of the Nurse's argument lies not in any redefinition of hybris, but in the equation of resistance to (illicit) sexual passion with a challenge to the honour of the goddess of sexual love; this might well be considered an illegitimate dialectical move, but the move from 'challenging the honour of the gods' to hybris is perfectly justified in terms of Greek usage; it is consonant even with Fisher's restricted definition of the term. There is a degree of confusion in Fisher's argument here, but behind that lies a desire to create as much distance as possible between hybris and 'thinking big'; it will not work. The same is true of the discussion of hybris and mega phronein in connexion with Aphrodite's account of her grievance against Hippolytus, rendered in the prologue. Fisher recognizes that Aphrodite complains in general of an insult to her honour, and that she is now set on revenge precisely because she wishes to establish that mortals may not so lightly seek to deny her her due; he also points out that the goddess' complaint against Hippolytus' verbal insults (13) is justified by Hippolytus' attitude towards her in his dialogue with the Servant (102, 106, 113) .66 Yet according to Fisher, the insult constituted by Hippolytus' attitude is a mild one, one at which Aphrodite 'should not' take offence, and which Fisher himself 'would prefer not' to label hybristic. This is not the place for a discussion of the seriousness of Hippolytus' offence; but the point is that he surely does give offence.67 Whether Fisher would or would not choose to label Hippolytus' behaviour hybristic is neither here nor there, for what we are dealing with is the goddess' evaluation of the he situation. Of course some people (or gods) are more sensitive to perceived affronts than others; some see an insult where no normal person would; thus what one person considers hybris might not be so regarded by another; but if an individual sincerely regards another's behaviour as manifesting unwarranted self-assertion at his/her expense, then that individual is linguistically and culturally justified in describing it as hybris. Others may disagree with Aphrodite's perception of hybris in Hippolytus, but there can be little doubt that it is hybris of which she accuses him. The expression she uses, however, is not hybris, but mega phronein (6); yet it is clear that Hippolytus' 'large thoughts' have a target-o6lXXc ' 6(oot 'povofne tv eit fort; g(y8a, says Aphrodite, and she explains her statement with reference to the gods' paramount concern to receive time from mortals (7-8). Not only can 'thinking big' in practice constice constitute an affront, but the phrase itself can be used actually to refer to the commission of an affront. Thus there is no possibility of a neat separation of 'thinking big' from hybris.68 66 Fisher 416-17. 67 Fisher (417) sees the Servant's attempt to avert Aphrodite's anger (114-20) as evidence that Hippolytus' lifestyle, demeanour, and specific remarks do not constitute a major insult; but the Servant only feels driven to make this attempt because of his concern at the danger of what Hippolytus has said, and his wish that Aphrodite show forgiveness is a reminder that gods take such attacks on their honour extremely seriously. 68 Cf. A. Pers. 800-31 (Fisher 259-61); hybris (808, 820) certainly refers to concrete acts, including failure to recognize the honour of the gods (807-12), but it is also associated with 'godless thoughts' (808), 'thinking excessively for a mortal' (820), 'despising one's present fortune' (825), 'excessively boastful thoughts' (827-8), and 'harming the gods with over-boastful boldness' (831); if the disastrous results of hybris (821-2) give a reason for avoiding excessive, unmortal thoughts (820; n.b. ,yp. 821), then 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' must be a form of hybris; see Dickie (n. 2) 107. Fisher answers Dickie by making the dangerous concession that 'having excessive thoughts' may be 'an element' in hybris here, but maintains that not all such self-assertion is hybristic. The (fallacious) argument that, because hybris and 'thinking big' are not identical in definition, they are never identical in reference is also used (308-9) to distinguish hybrizein and hybris in S. Ant. 480 and 482 from mega phronein in 479.
The previous paragraphs have discussed those passages which contain references to both hybris and 'thinking big' etc. and which offer some hope of establishing the relationship between the two. They have shown that subjective dispositions of self-assertion, describable as 'thinking big', can be considered as genuine cases of hybris and that even where hybris also encompasses acts which have an impact on the honour of others, mega phronein etc. can refer to its dispositional aspect. 
The question of offences against the gods and their phthonos has already been touched upon; we now need to decide to what extent hybris may be an offence which arouses the anger of the gods, and whether divine phthonos can be a reaction to human hybris. Fisher's exhaustive study has performed an enormous service by refuting the misconception that there is something fundamentally 'religious' about the concept of hybris, whether that misconception be what he assails as the 'traditional view' (hybris as a form of human presumption which meets with divine nemesis, especially in tragedy)70 or the more interesting, but equally unsubstantiated thesis of Gernet (on the essentially religious quality of time).71 Nevertheless, even under Fisher's conception of hybris it is clear that the victim of insulting or dishonouring behaviour can be a god as well as a mortal; and so he discusses a number of passages in which hybriswords are used explicitly to denote attacks on divine time72
In the previous section, too, we saw that the 'thinking big' which can often be construed as hybris could impinge upon divine as well as human honour.73 A species of 'thinking big' is 'thinking more than mortal thoughts', and we saw in connexion with Darius' speech in Persae (n. 68) that such thoughts could be part and parcel of hybris. Another example might be the description of Capaneus in the Septem; Capaneus' boast o5 KOCx' 5vOpontov pov?i (425), and he is openly contemptuous of Zeus and the gods (427-31); Eteocles sees him as a thinker of 'vain thoughts' and comments on his dishonouring of the gods through his boasts (438-43). That this behaviour can be described as hybris is clear, and Fisher concedes that, 'When verbal kompoi and mataia phronemata take these forms and are expressly directed against the honours and powers of the gods, they clearly constitute hybris;' but 'that is not to say that all boasting and foolish thoughts can be so Cf, e.g., the Aristotelian passages in sect. II in which hybris is associated with wealth, power, and misplaced confidence in continued good fortune; cf. E. Supp. 463-4, 726-30, 741-4 (Fisher 420-1 516-17, 553-5, 1297, 1347) . Hybris may also concern the gods in the sense that they are felt to punish hybris among mortals; but here again hybris is no more specifically religious in nature than any other form of human injustice; see Fisher, Index, s.v. 'gods, concern at hybris/injustice, etc.', and cf. MacDowell G&R (n. 2) 22. 73 Most explicitly in the case of E. Hipp. 6-8, 13, and Hdt. vii lOE.
; the first and third of these passages contain absolute uses of hybrizein, and again Fisher's translation, 'commit hybris', begs the question by assuming specific acts against particular victims). Cf also the hybris of Cyrus' sacred white horse (Hdt. i 89; Fisher 353-4; MacDowell, G&R [n. 2] 15), which is not disobedience towards its master (Fisher's standard explanation of the hybris of domestic animals, 119-20), but the creature's misplaced confidence that it is able to ford a river which

described'.74 That this is not an admission that 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' is always hybris is made clear by his discussion of Clytemnestra's speech at Ag. 958-74; 'such over-confident boasting of one's good-fortune [sic]
and its permanence should ... be classified rather as a strong form of "saying things too great for mortals" (etc.), that, because they can be offensive to other humans and to the gods, may conceivably be considered as (mildly) hybristic'.75 Fisher's position seems to be that 'thinking (and expressing) more than mortal thoughts' and hybris are conceptually distinct, but that a strong form of the former may (as a matter of contingency) constitute a mild form of the latter, even in the absence of the desire deliberately to inflict dishonour on a specific victim. This attempt to have one's cake and eat it will not work;76 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' is unlike 'thinking big' in that the latter can, apparently, be justified; the former, however, entails the notion of excess and always involves reprehensible self-assertion in the face of legitimate claims to time; thus it always constitutes a standard case of hybris in its unattenuated sense.77 There is in many passages a strong connexion between 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' and divine phthonos. Fisher accepts the existence of a notion of divine phthonos which focuses on recognized moral offences on the part of human beings;78 he is less willing, however, to accept that such moralized phthonos may have human hybris as its object. Yet Herodotus'
account of Xerxes' invasion of Greece, as we have seen, draws clear links between hybris, human presumption, dishonouring the gods, and divine phthonos. Themistocles' retrospective explanation of the success of Greek resistance (viii 109.3) contains traces of all these notions.
Greek victory, he says, was not achieved by merely mortal means, but the gods and heroes resented (begrudged, were envious-tof6vrjav) that one man, an impious and wanton (atasthalos) man, a man who committed gross acts of sacrilege, who actually lashed and bound the sea, should rule Asia and Europe. The phthonos identified here focuses not only on the presumption first made apparent in Xerxes' initial proposal to add Europe to add Europe to his rule (vii 8p-y), the kind of presumption which Artabanus could describe both as a form of 'thinking big' liable to attract divine phthonos (7. 10E) and as hybris (vii 16a.2), but also on the specific acts of impiety and atasthalia which even Fisher agrees may be regarded as hybris.79 This phthonos clearly bears a considerable moral charge, and responds both to hybristic deeds and to hybristic attitudes. We should expect that wherever divine phthonos bears a similar reference to more than mortal thoughts which directly impugn the time of the gods it should also be regarded as 
1) is right to argue that the mere occurrence of the term nemesis is no proof that Croesus is to be regarded as guilty of hybris, for the supposed correlation between human hybris and divine nemesis which is such a feature of the 'traditional view' is poorly attested. Instead, Fisher agrees with Gould (n. 59) 79 that nemesis bears its Homeric sense of 'indignation'; but when he claims that this nemesis is merely 'the "indignation" of an "envious" deity' (358) he ignores the fact that Homeric nemesis always focuses on some perceived offence (see
This is clearly the case in the 'carpet-scene' of the Agamemnon.81 Time is central to the scene; Clytemnestra's invitation is an attempt to persuade Agamemnon to lay claim to a greater
share of honour than a mortal should possess (922, 925), and her decisive argument, after which Agamemnon ceases to resist, appeals explicitly to his desire to be honoured (939). Agamemnon realizes, too, that Clytemnestra is urging him to exalt his own honour to the extent of dishonouring the gods, and is fully aware of the dangers of phthonos as a divine response (921,  946-7) ; unlike Herodotus' Croesus, he is determined to avoid counting himself happy before he is dead (927-30);82 and he remains uneasy even as he prepares to tread the crimson path, his aidos in 948-9 a sign that he realizes he is pushing his own claim to time' too far and failing to pay honour where honour is due.83 The phthonos of the gods which is so prominent in this context, then, does not focus only on human prosperity or success; rather, Agamemnon is persuaded to act in a way which demonstrates an illegitimate response to success, a response of over-valuation of one's own time^ clearly classifiable as the hybris which proceeds from prosperity. Fisher's insistence that Agamemnon's actions and motives, while representing 'more than mortal thoughts', constitute at most only a 'mild' form of hybris,84 becomes explicable when we realize that for him it is only the gravity of the act itself which really matters. But the
importance of the scene lies in what it tells us about Agamemnon's motivation and his sense of his own honour vis-a-vis that of others; the phthonos envisaged focuses on Agamemnon's excessive self-assertion, and this is hybristic precisely because its 'victims' are those who enjoy the greatest time of all. The scene suggests not only that 'thinking more than mortal thoughts'
is necessarily a form of hybris but also that phthonos and hybris can be correlatives. It remains to be seen, however, whether they are necessary correlatives, or only contingently so, where phthonos has become a just response to human offences rather than mere jealousy. We need, therefore, to explore the concept of phthonos in greater detail. As a human emotion, phthonos bears no essential reference to hybris. Human phthonos focuses on another's possession of goods which one would like for oneself; it presupposes no moral offence, but is a malicious reaction to others' success or good fortune which is frequently said to demonstrate the viciousness not of its target, but of its patient.85 Yet this phthonos does operate within the same milieu as hybris, in that it enjoys a fundamental relationship with the notion of honour. Phthonos can be directed at the possession of any good,86 but in practice the relationship between phthonos and competition for honour is intimate, first because it is typical of the phthoneros to resent not only the other's success, but also the enhanced reputation and status which success brings; phthonos, as a feeling that others' success somehow diminishes one's own standing, thus belongs with the competitive impulse of philotimia.8 Secondly, as a reaction to the possession of some admired good or quality, phthonos is the negative obverse of that that the statement at i 34.1 is referred in context to Solon's warning that the divine is 09ovep6v and tcapac6Sc; (i 32.1). Fisher is right to assimilate nemesis and phthonos in this case (contrast Gould [n. 59] 80), but wrong to deny their focus on an offence on Croesus' part.
81 For a recent discussion of the scene, with bibl., see G. Crane, CP lxxxviii ( . 1386b 18-20, 1387b21-1388a28 . Arist. Rhet. 1387b31-1388a23 on phthonos and philotimia, esp. the remarks on the grounds of phthonos  (1387b34-1388a5) and on its typical targets (1388a5-23). Cf. Walcot (n. 85) 16-20, 34, 62, 97-8; H. Lloyd-Jones,  Greek comedy, Hellenistic literature, Greek religion, and miscellanea (Oxford 1990) 255-7. positive acclaim which is conveyed by terms such as time, kleos, etc. Hence the commonplace that others' phthonos, though possibly harmful and certainly to be deprecated, is at least a sign of one's own achievement, that phthonos is better than pity.88
See
There is no question of a total separation of meaning between human and divine phthonos, and the conception of divine phthonos, I take it, will have grown out of the deeply rooted belief that the gods are givers of both good and evil on an apparently indiscriminate basis, and that they are particularly stinting (phthoneroi) in their granting of good fortune or in allowing it to continue.89 The idea that the gods somehow resent mortals' success has its roots in Homer,90 but is expressed in terms of phthonos (etc.) only in later authors such as Pindar, Aeschylus, A, and Herodotus. It is generally accepted that in these authors moral factors enter into the notion of divine phthonos to a greater or lesser degree, but there is real disagreement as to where the line should be drawn
between ('unmoralized') conceptions which focus on success alone and those ('moralized') which focus on human transgression.91 Fisher is firmly on the side of those who see real persistence of the unmoralized view (especially in Herodotus), and he draws an absolute distinction between the gods' punishment of hybris and their non-moral resentment of human prosperity; there may be a degree of overlap between the fields in which hybris and phthonos are operative (because divine phthonos may focus on human offences), but where the 'unmoralized' form of phthonos is in play, no overlap can exist; the gods' resentment of human prosperity in itself cannot be regarded as outrage at human hybris.92
This is debatable, for there are certain differences between human and divine phthonos which make it difficult to consider a conception of the latter which totally excludes the possibility of a relationship between divine phthonos and human hybris. In achieving the kind of success which annoys a god, a human being has transgressed a boundary in a way that the target of human phthonos has not; for, though it may be virtually impossible to know for certain where the limit lies, there certainly exists an unbridgeable gap in status between men and gods. Since this is true, and since it is well known that the gods resent all incursions into their sphere, it behoves any prosperous mortal to avoid antagonizing the gods by the appearance . 1944) 20, 28, 36-7, 39-42, 47-8 I1. xvii 70-1, Od. iv 181-2, v 118-20, viii 565-6, xiii 173-4, xxiii 209-12 Bulman (n. 85) 1, 31-4,  88 n. 66; for the second, see Greene (n. 89) 6-7, 48, 74-5, 84-8, 103, 106, 113 n. 54; Adkins (n. 88) Garvie (n. 2) 243-4, 249, 252. For Fisher's distinction  between 'moralized', 'unmoralized', and 'ambiguous' forms of divine phthonos, cf 360, 362. to manifest the correct attitude (to recognize the gulf between human and divine prosperity, as well as the role of the gods in human achievement), or on his active adoption of the wrong attitude (deliberate rejection of mortal limits, through an inflated conception of himself as master of his destiny and guarantor of his prosperity). The target of human phthonos, by contrast, is not necessarily deluded as to his real status and worth. Thus divine phthonos, even when focusing on the prosperity of its target, must always be a form of resentment in which the divine agent feels justified, in that the target has failed (by commission or omission) to recognize the boundary which separates his time from that of the gods.93 This can be demonstrated by passages in which the concept of divine phthonos is felt to be at its most 'unmoralized'. In Aeschylus' Persae, the divine phthonos which Xerxes, according to the Messenger, did not understand (362) is not explicitly referred either to great prosperity alone or to some more specific offence; it certainly belongs with the Messenger's ascription of the defeat at Salamis to the influence of an alastr or kakos daimn (354), as with similar Persian pronouncements on the unpredictability of (unnamed) daimones, but there is also stress in the context on Xerxes' confidence (352, 372-3) , which the Queen later explains in terms of the human tendency blindly to believe that present good fortune will continue forever (601-2). The unpredictability of fortune or of the gods who grant and withhold good fortune has been a theme since the beginning of thee theni of play (see 93-100, 157-8, 161-4); it was with the help of 'some god' that Darius amassed his great prosperity, and the correct attitude in anyone who would retain such prosperity is caution. The Messenger's reference to phthonos belongs with these hints of a mistaken attitude to prosperity and to the decisive role played by the gods in all human affairs which are later broadened into an account of the Persians' deluded pride, impiety, and hybris by the authoritative pronouncements of Darius' ghost.94 (i 32.1, iii 40. 2)95 the emphasis is more on the need to manifest the proper attitude in success than on the notion that success in itself provokes the gods to envy;
Similarly, in Herodotus' presentation of the warnings delivered by Solon to Croesus and Amasis to Polycrates
Croesus, Solon implies, should be more circumspect and less confident of his own happiness, given that prosperity is in the lap of the gods, with their tendency to disrupt human affairs. This point is just as clear in the case of Amasis' advice to Polycrates, which urges him, in view of the divine propensity to phthonos, to acknowledge the role of the gods in all human prosperity and to manifest a proper sense of perspective with regard to his wealth by jettisoning something he values highly. That the gods are not simply concerned with material wealth emerges in sinister fashion from the fact that even this propitiatory offering proves unsuccessful-the offence cannot be undone by material propitiation (and Polycrates' display of caution and humility comes too late to save him).96 In all these cases there exists at least a minimal idea of offence, and the conditions for describing the behaviour and motivations of the humans involved as hybris are, at least from the divine point of view, satisfied.
Neither in Persae nor in Herodotus, moreover, do apparently non-moral conceptions of divine phthonos constitute the last word on the subject. In Persae, the Persians' complaints 93Cf. (broadly) Lloyd-Jones (n. 64) 4, 56-8, 67-70, (n. 87) Fisher 357-60, 362-3 (resp. ). against the evil deities who have struck them down at the height of their fortunes are partisan,97 and belong with a perspective which seeks to minimize the notion of Persian offence; the true perspective is offered by the ghost of Darius, but it is one which the Athenian audience will already have formed for themselves as they set the remarks of the Persian characters in the context of all that is said about Persian prosperity and presumption. Likewise in Herodotus, most of the references to divine phthonos come in speeches,9 and in the cases of Solon, Amasis, and Artabanus their purpose is precisely to warn without giving offence; all three try to promote the correct attitude to one's own prosperity and the prerogatives of the gods, and so remind their interlocutors of the dangers of offending jealous and resentful deities, as a way of stressing the dangers without actually accusing them of hybris. The suggestion of hybris, however, is there; Solon, Amasis, and Artabanus are not denying that divine phthonos is a response to a perceived human offence; they are rather suggesting that the gods have a tendency to perceive offence where none is intended. The implication that divine resentment is sometimes excessive and unjustified allows the warning to be conveyed without explicit accusation of hybris. But the gods themselves believe their phthonos to be justified, and the author or the reader can always endorse this interpretation.99 Thus Solon, diplomatically, speaks of the instability of good fortune and reminds his host of the grudging meddlesomeness of the divine; but the reader will have noted the dangerous moral blindness involved in Croesus' conviction that his prosperity is paramount and permanent, and the notion that forthcoming himself (not, as Lloyd-Jones points out,.00 because he was) the most fortunate of men.0' An evaluation in terms of phthonos, then, can never entirely rule out an interpretation of the same state of affairs in terms of human hybris. In all behaviour which attracts divine phthonos will be found the same elements of the transgression of limits, of the offender's excessive pursuit of honour and status, and sof the corresponding insult to the time of the gods. See 345-7, 353-4, 472-3, 513-16, 724-5, 909-11, 920-1, 942-3, 1005-7 That divine phthonos is by definition justified seems to be the view favoured by Aeschylus in Pers. and Ag., and to be implied in Herodotus. Similarly Pindar's references to divinephthonos (01. 13.24-8, Pyth. 8.71-2, 10.20-1,  Isth. 7.39-42 ) belong with warnings such as 'Seek not to become Zeus' (Isth. 5.14, cf. 01. 5.24) and his stress on  the objective limits dividing man and god (Nem. 6.1-4) . See Lloyd-Jones (n. 64) 69; Bulman (n. 85) 31. Kirkwood (n. 88) imagines that the use of divine phthonos as a 'rhetorical formula of praise' (174-6) entails the absence of 'the Herodotean religious meaning' (182; cf. 176, 179) . The two are not incompatible; even if the former is primary, it implies the latter. the essence of hybris, even when associated with such ideas, is always to be found in a more immediate and specific reference to dishonour. Crucial to MacDowell's case are those passages in which hybris is attributed to animals and plants, which he maintains cannot simply be dismissed as metaphorical, but must contribute to an overall definition.103
VI
On the basic question of the status of the hybris of animals and plants I agree with Fisher that such manifestations must be regarded as metaphorical and therefore as parasitic on standard applications of the term. None the less, there must be a ground for the metaphorical extension, and we are entitled to look for the point of comparison in something that vehicle and tenor may be thought to have in common, the identification of which may prove enormously helpful in establishing the flavour or character of a concept.'04 For Fisher, the point of comparison in the case of domestic animals and plants lies in a sense that they are 'disobedient', dishonouring human beings by 'refusing' to behave as required;'05 in wild animals and natural forces such as the winds and the sea, on the other hand, the point of comparison is the violence and aggression which the elements share with hybristic humans.106 According to Xenophon, Cyr. vii 5.62-3, for example, horses which are hybristai cease to bite and to hybrizein once castrated; similarly, bulls cease to mega phronein and apeithein, and dogs to desert their masters. The notion of disobedience, which can certainly be construed as offering dishonour to a superior, is clearly there, and Fisher (119) sees this as the main reference of the hybris-words in this passage. Equally, however, both mega phronein and apeithein may convey some of the force of hybris here, and indeed the aspect of arrogant pride and wilfulness will be difficult to separate from that of disobedience, given that, in a domestic animal, the latter can always be construed in terms of the former and the former always furnish the explanation for the latter. This passage is compatible with Fisher's definition, although it also offers scope for an interpretation which lays more stress on the dispositional aspect.
Elsewhere, however, and indeed in general, the metaphor is better explained with reference to dispositional factors. Common to a number of metaphorical applications, for example, is a reference to food.'07 The analogy between the over-feeding which produces hybris in animals and plants and the wealth or good fortune which commonly leads to hybris in standard, human cases is well explained by Michelini, who also notes how the opposition between the hybris of plants and that of humans is mediated by the frequent association of the latter with both koros and vegetation imagery This notion of nurture and vegetationrowth is notion of nurture and growth in itself suggests those ideas of 'being full of oneself, 'becoming too great' which I have argued to be important, and surely implies a process in the hybristic organism itself, a process resulting in a condition of satiety in which the potency or energy of the subject exceeds the norm; in a human being this will be the disposition of excessive self-assertion which arises from having had too much of a good thing and entails the feeling that one's own claims are superior to those of others."0 This notion of excessive energy or power is present even in the passage from the Cyropaedia (above). The point of the reference to the hybris of horses (the megalophrosyne^ of bulls, etc.) is that it can be cured by castration (as it can in humans-the ultimate point is an analogy between castrated male animals and eunuch bodyguards). We do not have to look far to discover why it is that castration should be felt to cure hybris-there is clearly a link between the powerful forces of masculinity and a headstrong spirit which values self over others and rejects young;'19 and in the connexion between hybris and alcohol in sympotic contexts,'20 where the significance of the concept is not exhausted by reference to the concrete acts of dishonour undoubtedly perpetrated by drunken hybristai, but also resides at least partly in the fact that alcohol unleashes energies which are normally repressed.'12 The notion of exuberance and excess energy is thus to be linked to the element of self-assertion, over-confidence, and presumption in hybris, in both metaphorical and non-metaphorical passages;122 it gives us a great deal of the flavour of hybris-not, indeed, the essence of the concept, but an important aspect of its phenomenology, and, I should say, of its 'meaning'.
If this is correct, there are important consequences for the treatment of hybris in Plato. Fisher contends that Plato revalues hybris, greatly extends its range, and adapts it to his own, highly individual philosophy. 'Platonic' forms of hybris emerge in works of Plato's middle period, especially in the Phaedrus, and are atypical in that they represent hybris as any form of excessive desire (though the paradigm of such hybris is sexual desire) and oppose hybris to sophrosyne in what Fisher claims is a much more general sense than is normally the case.'23 While I would not deny that Plato does very occasionally extend the application of hybris, I do not agree that he ever redefines the concept, and I believe that, if we give the dispositional aspect of hybris and its frequent representation in the language of exuberance and energy their due importance,124 then we can dispense with the distinction between 'Platonic' and 'traditional' uses.
Fisher's identification of a Platonic revaluation of hybris starts from a discussion of the relevant terms in the Phaedrus. In the first passage discussed in this connexion (237d-238c), it is indeed clear that some extension of the regular meaning has occurred, for hybris is explicitly applied to the rule in the soul of any form of irrational desire, opposed to s6phrosyne qua rule of reason over desire, and specifically said to include excessive desires for food, drink, and sex. The surprise in this passage is the extension of hybris to cover gluttony and dipsomania; but the surprise is softened, first (as Fisher himself points out, 468) by the regular association of hybris with food and drink-food and drink-food and drink can be seen as leading to hybris, and one can eat and drink in a hybristic manner.125 But this association with food and drink does not normally extend to the identification of the specific desires for such things with hybris, and to that extent the use of hybris here is anomalous. The anomaly, however, is slight, and it is further reduced by the antithesis with sophrosynel (which is regular and traditional). Furthermore, as Fisher again makes clear (ibid.), the personificatory language of (here) bipartition facilitates an understanding of 119 See esp. Arist., Rhet. 1389b8-9, 11-12, to be seen in the context of the spirited impulsiveness of youth (1389a2-bl2 passim); cf. PI. Laws 835e, where the hybris of youth is explicitly associated with being well fed; cf. n. 108 above, and Fisher 20, 97-9, and Index, s.v. 'youth'. 120 See Fisher 16-17, 57-8, 98-102, 145, 203-7, 488; also Index, s.vv. 'symposia', 'drink'. N.b. esp. Panyassisfr. 13 Davies (Fisher 206). The links between drink, the control of passions, and the terminology of honour and shame are explored below re Plato's Laws. 122 We should perhaps remember that the notion of 'flourishing' is typically opposed to hybris not only in the case of plants but also in connexion with both youth and the symposium (see hybris as the refusal to fulfil one's allotted role, which can readily be construed as the dishonouring of superior by inferior. In so far as hybris is attributed to the quasi-personified desiderative part, then, its sense is quite regular and traditional; the departure from tradition comes only when this hybris of one part of the soul against another is said to account for hybris of the whole person. But this extension, as we have seen, is mitigated; and it is further mitigated by the fact that the main point of the passage is the condemnation of pederastic sexual desire, for in pederastic contexts hybris has come to be used as a descriptive term for practices which as a matter of fact involve the dishonour of a submissive by a dominant party.126 Also relevant, however, is the fact that hybris is not just the name for a type of act or intention to act, but can refer more generally to self-indulgent and egotistical self-assertion; such self-assertion, in the Greek context, is always a matter of honour, in that it inevitably involves an image of oneself and one's status which implies as a correlative a certain attitude towards the claims of others. In applying hybris to all forms of excessive desire (desires which involve excessive self-assertion both on the part of the whole person and on that of the desiderative part of the soul), Plato is exploiting the most fundamental of all significances of hybris, the idea that hybris involves a disposition in the agent which overvalues self and undervalues others. The hybris identified in this passage, then, is less startling under an interpretation which gives the dispositional aspect of hybris its due than it s a t under one which stresses the actual over the dispositional. This is as far as Plato goes in extending the sense of hybris. The other passages in the Phaedrus are fully explicable in traditional terms; at 250e the opposition of psychic parts is not in question, and the hybris of the man who, on seeing the earthly manifestation of the e Beautiful, conceives the desire the d'gesi the way of a four-footed animal and sow children' is opposed both to reverence (sebas) for the beautiful object and to aischyne at pursuing unnatural pleasure; it is thus fully at home in its normal context of honour and shame, of the disgrace of pederastic desires,127 and of the pursuit of self-asse rtion in the face of the honour of others. The next relevant passage comes in the description of the horses which draw the chariot of the soul, and so the opposition of psychic parts is relevant, but once again the personification of the parts makes the hybris of the bad horse analogous to that of a whole person; the good horse is a 'lover of time with siphrosyne and aidos', the bad 'a companion of hybris and alazoneia' (253d-e). Both sides of this antithesis deal with attitudes to honour; the good horse values honour, but observes limit in its pursuit, its aidos recognizing the point at which excessive pursuit of time violates the honour of others and so becomes dishonourable for oneself, while the bad exaggerates its own importance (alazoneia) and pursues its selfish goals in excessive ways which dishonour others (hybris).2 Hybris here, to be sure, is used in the service of a highly individual Platonic doctrine, but its actual significance in the description of the personified psychic force is wholly traditional. Of course, the implication is there that the hybris of the 'bad horse', which represents the purely selfish, irrational, appetitive aspect of the human personality, will, if it prevails, translate into hybris of the lover against his paidika, and so there is a close link between these passages and the earlier at 237d-238c; but the application of hybris to all desires, while perhaps not totally abandoned, is at least not mentioned in these later passages, and so the hybris of the individual in whose soul the hybris of the appetites prevailed would be readily explicable as the standard hybris of the pederast, abandoning proper self-control in favour of selfish desires which take no account of the honour of the other party. The real importance of the attribution of hybris to the bad horse lies in the recognition that this kind of self-assertion or self-indulgence springs from forces within the personality which subvert the individual's concern for the honourable; In both applications of hybris-words here we are dealing with states of character in which an excess of vigour, 'quickness', or manliness leads to a breakdown in the personality; this aspect of the context is much more prominent than any implicit reference to aggression against others (though aggression is the consequence of the relevant character defect which makes it so problematic). The references to hybris must be understood in terms of the general opposition between self-control and self-assertion as dispositions dispositions of character; this is confirmed in the ensuing discussion of the twin methods of interweaving of andreia and sophrosyne, through education and eugenics, which emphasizes the importance of avoiding intermarriage within the two character-types-continuedinued intermarriage between brave and brave with no admixture of sophrosyne will issue in madness, while that between souls 'too full of aides and unmixed with manly daring' will eventually produce complete passivity (3 10d-e). Two points in this last 129 In manifesting hybris and alazoneia, the bad horse, which represents the epithymetikon, is being credited with thymoeidic responses; but this phenomenon, in which each 'psychic part' possesses the capacities which typify the others, is a regular feature of Plato's tripartition, not a sign that For the opposition, hybris/akolasialmadness versus sophrosynellimit, cf. Phlb. 26b, 45d-e,  Soph. 228d-229a (Fisher 478-9) . dispositional sense; the other terms are all dispositions or drives of agents, not forms of behaviour, and the purpose of the list is to name affections which naturally incline us to be confident and bold; it is thus impossible that hybris should refer to 'insulting violence and [unfortunate phrase] straight sexual excesses'.136 So hybris is here a dysfunctional trait of character involving excessive boldness or confidence and a desire for some form of pleasure. The same characteristics recur in a specifically sexual context at 782e-783a.137 Where in the Phaedrus all excessive desires, including eros, were called hybris, here excessive desires for food and drink as well as for sex are called eros, and it is the last, the keenest form, which most sets people on fire with maniai burning with the greatest hybris; all three desires, however, are nosemata and their growth and onrush are to be quenched.'38 The 'growth and onrush' are those of the noseimata, not of hybris,'39 but still the fact that the eros which is regarded as a disease can 'burn with hybris' and produce madness reveals that we are dealing with that complex of ideas in which the deviant psychological drives which cause disturbances within human beings have much in common with the uncontrolled vital-forces which are described as hybris in plants.'40 We thus have the Phaedrus' identification of sexual and non-sexual desires as manifestations of one drive with different objects; this assimilation of other desires to the sexual urge combines with the presence of the metaphorical associations of hybris with exuberance, fertility, and turmoil in regularizing the application of hybris to all forms of desire (for hybris is regularly linked with eros in its everyday sense, and if all desires are forms of eros, then hybris can be associated with all desires). But this hybris is also a matter of excessive self-assertion at others' expense, logos. 14 That Plato's view of hybristic desires is firmly rooted in the traditional significance of hybris is made clear by the discussion of three types of philia at 837a-d. The essential distinction is between the love of the body, a form of philia which is based on the lover's desire to obtain from the beloved something that he lacks, and a form which exists between equals and is reciprocated, the desire of one soul for another like itself. These forms can, however, be 136 Fisher 488. 137 Discussed by Fisher 485-6, and classified as 'Platonic'. 138
England's explanation of the Mss. oe4vv6Ovrov as scribal error is persuasive, and it would be better to read op?vv6voat with the Aldine. 139 Hybris does, however, occur as the object of sbennumi at 835d-e, where hybris is a fire/disease/desire which burns and grows within the (well-fed) individual and leads to self-indulgent sexual behaviour. 140 The notion of hybris as a form of disease or madness which results from too much of a good thing (n.b. tryphe at 691a) is active at 691c: giving 'more to the less' and disregarding moderation (e.g. sails to ships, food to bodies, and rule to souls) results sometimes in disease, sometimes in 'the offspring of hybris', injustice. The participle t3uppfovToc applies both to those things which break out into disease and those which produce injustice; we thus have a notion of physical disease as the result of a form of hybris in the organism which comes of over-feeding. The verb exhybrizein suggests in itself the bursting out of a hybris hitherto contained, and this fits very well with the statement that adikia is the offspring of hybris; hybris is thus the disposition, the force which grows out of control within the individual, and injustice is its issue in concrete acts. Fisher (19, 112, 120-1, 129-30, 135, 147, 299, 344,  388, 393-4, 427, 489 [this passage] ) typically refers the verb to the commission of acts. 141 Cf. 835d-e (above n. 139) and 831c-e, where the elements of eros, shamelessness, and selfishness strongly suggest a hybris which lies in neglecting one's proper concerns as a human being in favour of a hedonistic conception of advantage. combined within one individual, which inevitably causes a conflict of desires,142 between the motivation of one whose passion is a physical craving like hunger and who 'awards no time? to the character of the beloved's soul' and that of one 'who considers the desire for the body to be a matter of no importance', and who 'regards the fulfilment of the body with the body as hybris, and because he both respects and reveres sophrosyne, bravery, magnificence, and phronesis, would wish to remain pure forever with a pure beloved' (837b-d) .
The hybris which the pure lover rejects is traditional in two ways; first, it involves that lack of regard for the honour of the beloved that is attributed to the base, physical lover, and concentrates instead on selfish gratification of extravagant desires; and secondly, it constitutes a failure to live up to the standards of behaviour proper for one who aspires to virtue. This last makes contact with hybris in its traditional guise because Plato sees good performance of one's allotted role as a human being as a matter of paying honour where honour is most due-to reason, to the soul rather than the body, and ultimately to the gods. Indulgence of one's baser desires is hybris because it involves exalting oneself, and the inferior part of oneself, in the face of the much weightier claims to consideration of reason, the good, and the divine. Plato's ideas of what sorts of action or desire qualify as hybris may be idiosyncratic and extreme, but his view of what hybris is is entirely traditional; hybris is still a matter of illegitimately placing oneself, one's desires, and one's own claim to honour before the legitimate claims of others.
One final passage may help to draw these ideas together. At 713c the Athe enian begins a myth which is used to illustrate the disasters which ensue when human beings order their lives and their communities without deference to an ultimate, divine authority. Human nature is insufficient to order human affairs without hybris and adikia (713c), and so Kronos placed human communities under the rule of daimones, whose kingship made for peace, aidos, eunomia and an abundance of justice, and an abundance of justice, and mae human peoples free from faction and happy (713c-e). Contemporary communities must, as far as possible, recreate this kind of regime, in which the divine rather than the human is the ultimate source of authority, and foster obedience to the divine in us (713e-714a); the alternative, be it rule of one man, few men, or many, is irremediable disaster, caused by the insatiable urge to gratify extreme desires (714a).143 These remarks are presently followed by an appeal to the colonists of the new city, which extols humility before 'the god' and his attendant, Justice, and warns: if anyone, raised up by pride [megalauchia], whether exulting in money or honours, or again in bodily beauty along with youth and senselessness, blazes in his soul with hybris,'44 as if he needed neither ruler nor any leader at all, but were actually sufficient to lead others, he is left behind deserted by god, and, once left behind, he takes to himself yet others of the same kind and romps [GKtpTx], throwing everything at once into confusion; to a good many people he seems to be someone, but after a short time he pays to justice no negligible penalty, and utterly destroys himself, his household, and his city (715e-716b). 142 This conflict is not presented as one between psychic parts, but as one between the two other types of lover, concrete persons representing abstract types of motivation. Thus we do not quite have the personification of the good and the bad horse of the Phaedrus myth, and the hybris which is associated with the inferior form of eros/philia is that of a type of individual rather than of one part of the soul against another. Cf. England (n. 135) ii 344, on 837a2, and 345 on 837b8. 143 The paradosis would introduce the metaphor of disease at this point (714a5-6); but England's ([n. 135] i 442) defence of Hermann's seclusion of vof.uLatl is persuasive. 144 It is unclear what text Fisher (489) is translating, but the Mss. 6 6t tI; txap0ets;...4XyEOat ...KaxraXett-Erat, printed by Burnet, will not do. We need either the et 6t ti; of some quotations or the 6 S6 tI; explained by England ([n. 135] i 448-9). N.b. that the conditions described in I xplra nv...cvotofc are those which are typically associated with hybris; if, therefore, England is right to take this phrase as subordinate to tapeots; bn6 'EyaXWxXftax;, this is a sign of the closeness of hybris and megalauchia here.
Fisher calls this passage 'a mixture of old and new ideas', but there is no element which is not thoroughly traditional. The hybris of the unjust type is, as usual, something which results from too much of a good thing, a powerful force, associated with youth and high spirits, which builds up within the individual until it can be contained no more,'45 and which involves over-valuing one's own qualities to the extent that one under-values the claims of others and neglects one's social role. The novelty of the passage for Fisher seems to lie first in the stress placed on the role of the divine, and secondly in the notion of hybris in the soul; but although in both these directions Plato is using hybris as a n element in a moral theory that is certainly highly individual, his application of the term is in no way revisionary. Fisher is right to link this passage with others on the need to honour the soul, or the immortal in us,146 but while this does introduce the idea of the divided soul it implies no novel extension of the meaning of hybris, for hybris in such a context remains the insolent and self-centred failure to pay honour where honour is due.
The exhortations to honour the soul and to refrain from hybris belong very closely with similar exhortations to honor the gods; in the immediate sequel to the passage quoted the hybristic way of life is contrasted with following the divine, behaving with sophrosyne, and honouring especially the gods and one's parents (716c-718a); this exhortation is then followed by a coda in which one's obligations to honour other relatives, philoi, and guests are also mentioned (718a). The emphasis on the need to honour the gods above all is typical of the Laws, but it entails no revaluation of the concept of hybris in the direction of a specifically religious offence; rather, since the gods are firmly entrenched at the top of a hierarchy of honour, hybris against them is the worst hybris of all.'47 Similarly, the hybris which involves a failure to honour the best part of oneself is a matter of withholding due deference; in dishonouring what should be an internal source of authority one is also giving in to a powerfully disruptive psychic force and failing to fulfil one's social role;148 these are traditional elements in the concept, and this way of looking at the matter is not a Platonic revaluation of hybris, but rather Plato's way of explaining what hybris, in its traditional guise, really is. The extreme over-valuation of the self that is hybris is, for Plato, a failure to control disruptive forces within the personality, a refusal to accept one's place within a rational system, and an exaltation of the merely human (or less than human) at the expense of the divine. Plato's recognition of the associations of hybris with exuberance, vigour, disease, and madness is, because it forms such an obvious point of contact between his view and some of the earliest poetic applications, valuable evidence of the dispositional basis of hybris. Since Plato does give the dispositional aspect its full significance and does connect hybris with failure to know one's place in society and in the universe as a whole, he is in some ways less revisionary in his approach to the concept than is Aristotle. 145 Excess energy and high spirits, I think, are the basic connotations of aKitpT4 at 716b2; cf. Ar. Vesp. 1303-6. Fisher (491) would specify 'sexual excitement or over-confident violence'. 146 Cf. 697c-d, 726a-728c (Fisher 490) . 147 Cf. the hierarchy of kinds of hybris at 884a-885b (Fisher 483-5).
In Cairns (n. 35) 373-8 I underestimate the extent to which Plato's emphasis on 'honouring the soul' implies an internalized form of aidos; but see 378 n. 103 on 837c.
